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THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: 
TROUBLE FOR THE MATERIALIST 
OR THE EMERGENT DUALIST? 
Warren Shrader 
As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a unity-of-
consciousness (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument 
and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant 
one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then 
argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to 
fear from Hasker's argument, for a separate premise detailing the explanato-
ry relationship that must hold between physical and mental states is false, or 
at least unmotivated by Hasker's reasoning. I then turn the tables on Hasker, 
showing how the unity theses discussed open the way to an argument against 
emergent dualism. My conclusion is that the unity of consciousness actually 
poses a greater problem for the emergent dualist than for the materialist. 
Recently, in the pages of this journaP as well as in his latest book,2 William 
Hasker revives and defends the idea, discussed by Descartes, Leibniz, and 
Kant, among others, that the unity of conscious experience implies that the 
mind is not a material object. This unity-oj-consciousness (UOC) argument 
functions as Hasker's main argument against materialism as he builds his 
case for his preferred theory of the mind, emergent dualism, according to 
which not only are there emergent mental properties (causally efficacious 
properties dependent on, yet irreducible to, physical properties) but emer-
gent mental substances (minds) as well. 
Despite the central role this UOC argument plays in his project, it is not 
entirely clear what Hasker means in saying that conscious experience is 
unified, nor is it obvious how his thoughts on unity support the premises 
of the argument. A thorough analysis of his argument thus requires an in-
vestigation into what unity theses Hasker endorses. Before embarking on 
such an investigation, however, it will be helpful to review the general con-
tours of Hasker's argument and construct a formalized version of it. With a 
solid understanding of the argument secured, I hope to show that Hasker 
requires two distinct unity theses to lend credence to two distinct prem-
ises of his UOC argument. Though these unity theses are plausible, I think 
Hasker's argument ultimately fails in that a separate premise is false, or at 
least highly dubious given the rationale Hasker offers for believing it. 
l. Hasker's Argument Formalized 
The fullest presentation of Hasker's argument appears in his book The 
Emergent Self, wherein he asks us to consider as a premier example of a 
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unified conscious experience his awareness of his entire visual field at a 
time (p. 125). Having such an awareness, claims Hasker, is just being in a 
particular mental state, call it 'SQ' and presumably being in this state cor-
responds to the mind's instantiating a certain qualitative property, call it 
'Q.' Hasker thinks the existence of SQ poses a significant problem for the 
materialist, whose view Hasker characterizes as entailing that the mind is 
a composite material object consisting of distinct subunits (proper parts), 
some of which are responsible for modeling or representing distinct por-
tions of information about the external world.3 Since it does not seem pos-
sible that any of these proper parts of the brain exemplify Q for each rep-
resents only part of the information from Hasker's visual field, it must be 
the brain itself, or a large part thereof, that exemplifies Q. (Let us assume, 
for ease of discussion, that the materialist identifies the mind with the en-
tire brain-the argument will apply equally well to the mind as any other 
composite physical object). The materialist's problem is accounting for the 
brain's exemplifying Q for if the brain is a system of its subunits, reasons 
Hasker, then the brain's exemplification of Q must consist in its parts hav-
ing the properties and relations they do. This follows from a more gen-
eral principle Hasker endorses, the Principle of Reducibility, which he 
adopts from Wilfrid Sellars: 
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property 
of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such 
and such qualities and stand in such and such relations, or roughly, 
every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and 
relations between, its constituents.4 
Hasker thinks Sellars intends and that we should interpret the locution 
"consist in" to mean "logically or conceptually necessitated by." But con-
scious properties do not so consist in properties of the brain's parts, rea-
sons Hasker. First, it is a clear truism that one's brain being aware of one's 
visual field cannot consist in its subunits being aware of the information 
they model, for proper parts of persons are not conscious and, even if they 
were, a conjunction of partial awarenesses does not imply the existence 
of a "total awareness," which is exactly what state S is supposed to be (p. 
128). And if the subunits are not aware of the information they model, 
then they exemplify only non-qualitative properties, the instantiation of 
which do not logically imply the instantiation of a qualitative property.s 
Ergo, materialism is false. 
We can formalize Hasker's UOC Argument as follows. Let 'm' denote 
the mind, 'p' the brain, and 'Pl' Pz ... Pn' the subunits of the brain that 
model information. Let 'Qx' denote the qualitative property of Px and 'Tx' 
denote Px's "total intrinsic property," a conjunctive property whose instan-
tiation entails the instantiation of all the intrinsic properties exemplified by 
Px' 'R' denotes the complex relational property whose instantiation entails 
the instantiation of all the relations instantiated by the members of Pl' .. Pn' 
And let SQstand for the mind's exemplifying Q SQx for the state that is Px-
exemplirymg-Qx and STX for the state that is px-exemplifying-Tx' Finally, let 
expressions in italics represent states of affairs, e.g., Qp is the state of affairs 
that is the brain's exemplifying Q. The argument proceeds as follows: 
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(1) SQ exists (i.e. Q is exemplified by m) 
(2) If Q is exemplified by p, then either: 
a. SQ must consist in SQl & SQ2 & ... & SQn or 
b. SQ must consist in STl & ST2 & ... & STn & R(PI ... p n)6 
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(3) SQ consists in STl & ST2 & ... & STn & R(PI ... Pn) only if S~s logically 
or conceptually necessitated by STl & Sn & ... & STn & l«Pl ... p) 
(4) - [SQ consists in SQl & SQ2 & ... & SQn] 
(5) - [SQ is logically or conceptually necessitated by Sn & Sn & ... & 
STn & R(Pl ... p)] 
(6) Q is not exemplified by p [2,3,4,5] 
(7) P is not m [I, 6 , Indiscemibility of Identicals] 
From here on I will refer to STl & Sn & ... & STn & R(pJ ... Pn)' the conjunc-
tion of the property instantiations of and relations between the parts of the 
brain, as P arts Since this is a UOC argument, we would expect at least one 
premise toP express a substantive thesis about the unity of consciousness or 
at least to receive its warrant from such a thesis. With that in mind, I tum 
to an examination of Hasker's thoughts on the unity of consciousness to 
determine if anything he says can be interpreted as an endorsement of a 
unity thesis supporting premises of his argument. 
II. Hasker on the Unity of Consciousness 
Hasker offers many examples of the unity of consciousness but never an 
explicit characterization of it. In addition to the example already intro-
duced (one's entire visual field at a time), Hasker suggests that we could 
II consider also as a datum the 'unified' experience of simultaneously feel-
ing a tickle, hearing a twig snap, and smelling gasoline." (p. 126, f. 40). The 
trouble is that none of these examples is very instructive, as each is con-
sistent with a variety of unity theses discussed in the literature, some of 
which are fairly trivial and of no relevance to Hasker's UOC Argument? 
However, Hasker at least implicitly endorses one substantive unity thesis, 
one that serves as a key premise in an argument he claims as a prede-
cessor to his own, the argument Kant critiques in his second paralogism. 
This argument proceeds from the premise that the action of any aggregate 
consists in the actions of its proper parts to the conclusion that thinking 
is only possible of a substance which, "not being an aggregate ... is ab-
solutely simple."8 The intermediate premise is a thesis about the unity of 
consciousness, which can be stated as follows: 
Mental State Unity Thesis (MSUT): A thought (mental state) is unified 
in that it cannot consist in different representations distributed among 
different beings. 
I think we can best make sense of MSUT if thoughts are understood as 
events or states that can be composed by other events or states (consider 
how a baseball game is composed of many distinct, simultaneous events-
the first pitch, the last out, etc.). Kant appears to dismiss the argument 
of the second paralogism by rejecting MSUT, claiming that since MSUT 
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is not a conceptual truth, we cannot rule out a priori thoughts consisting 
in other events acting together. But Hasker clearly favors MSUT. If we 
assume, as Hasker does, that states involving awarenesses are types of 
representational states, then premise (4) of the UOC argument is simply a 
direct consequence of MSUT. 
But premise (4) is not the only premise of Hasker's UOC Argument 
contingent on a unity claim. It seems to me that Hasker requires an ad-
ditional unity thesis in support of premise (1), for the existence of SQis a 
substantive claim in need of support. In saying this, I am not suggesting 
that there is any question as to whether Hasker experiences a unified vi-
sual field (though I disagree with him about the unity of consciousness, 
I do not deny him the experience of it!); rather, I am questioning why his 
experience should be construed as his being in one mental state. Perhaps 
Hasker's awareness of his visual field amounts to his being in numerically 
diverse states, all simultaneous, and all standing in the relation of "being 
co-conscious." Barry Dainton has defended such an account of the unity 
of consciousness. According to Dainton, "being co-conscious" is a funda-
mental, non-reducible relation that binds all of a subject's simultaneous 
conscious states together.9 To illustrate this, suppose Hasker's visual field 
consists of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a blue diamond. His being 
aware of his entire visual field would simply entail his being in the three 
distinct states, being aware of a yellow moon (call this Y), being aware of 
an orange star (0), and being aware of a blue diamond (B), each involving 
its own constitutive qualitative property, all standing in the co-conscious 
relation. One who holds this view need not concede that Hasker's total 
awareness is II a specific conscious state," and is not compelled to accept 
the existence of S or the truth of (1). Advocating (1) thus amounts to taking 
up a position on the structure of unified consciousness and thus requires 
a principle to support it. But MSUT is not up to the task. Though MSUT 
implies that SQ has a certain property (not consisting in representations 
distributed among different beings) if it exists, MSUT (along with Hask-
er's being in states Y, 0, and B) fails to imply that SQ exists. So armed only 
with MSUT, Hasker's argument is in trouble at (1). 
Fortunately for Hasker there is a further unity thesis that has been dis-
cussed in the literature that does imply the existence of S, one not explicitly 
endorsed by Hasker but nonetheless consistent with his expressed views 
on the unity of consciousness. Hasker hints at this additional thesis in his 
description of S as "my awareness of my present visual field" (p. 125), sug-
gesting that this state possesses its own phenomenology requiring us to 
countenance it as a separate state. What Hasker appears to have in mind, 
then, is that when he is in conscious states Y, 0, and B, he is concurrently 
in conscious state Z (being aware of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a 
blue diamond), a state with its own phenomenology and its own consti-
tutive qualitative property. This type of unity has been described by Tim 
Bayne and David Chalmers, who refer to it as phenomenal unity: 
Two conscious states are subsumptively phenomenally unified (or 
simply phenomenally unified) if there is something it is like for a sub-
ject to be in both states simultaneously ... When A and B are phenom-
enally conscious states, there is something it is like for a subject to 
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have A, and there is something it is like for a subject to have B. When 
A and B are phenomenally unified, there is not just something it is 
like to have each state individually: there is something it is like to 
have A and B together. lO 
37 
Bayne and Chalmers further elaborate on this passage by saying that, in 
essence, consciousness exhibits phenomenal unity when there is a set of 
phenomenal states such that the phenomenology of each member is sub-
sumed by a further state.ll We can thus cash out phenomenal unity more 
succinctly as follows: 
Phenomenal states Xl ... Xn (comprising set P) are phenomenally unified 
iff there is some state Y that subsumes the phenomenology of all the 
members of P. 
This basic idea can be extended to all of an individual's conscious states, 
resulting in the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (PUT): 
PUT: For any set of phenomenally conscious states of a subject at a giv-
en time, all the members of that set are phenomenally unifiedY 
PUT entails that if Hasker has any visual states at all, then SQ exists. PUT 
seems crucial to the success of "asker's UOC argument-it provides the 
warrant for (1) and thereby allows the argument to get off the ground. The 
question is, once the argument is off the ground, does it have any legs? 
Though I take no issue with premises (3), (4), and (5), and (1) seems solid 
given PUT, I do think (2) is dubious, especially given Hasker's reasons 
for accepting itY The remainder of my analysis will consist in a detailed 
discussion of premise (2). 
III. Hasker on the Explanatory Relation between SQand Pparts 
Premises (2) and (3) jointly imply that if p exemplifies Q, then SQ must 
be logically or conceptually necessitated by P arts But should the materi-
alist accept (2)? Only if compelled to believe Pthat qualitative properties 
are governed by the Principle of Reducibility. But I don't see why she 
should believe this. There is a related principle that the materialist would 
surely accept: 
Explain: all intrinsic properties of p are explainable in terms of Pparts 
Explain entails that S Q is explainable in terms of P arts But why think explain-
ing the mental properties of p requires a logica{ or conceptual link to Parts? 
Very few materialists would champion such a requirement-most w6uld 
endorse the view that conscious properties of the mind are" epistemically 
emergent," that they are caused or realized by physical properties of the 
brain or its parts, but not logically or conceptually necessitated by them. I 
would venture that such a position is near orthodoxy within contemporary 
philosophy of mind. That alone is no reason to think (2) is false, but it does 
suggest we should look at alternative interpretations of Explain and see 
why Hasker rejects them. Here are the three primary interpretations I see: 
(i) all intrinsic properties of p are logically or conceptually necessi-
tated by P parts 
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(ii) all intrinsic properties of p are metaphysically necessitated by 
P parts 
(iii) all intrinsic properties of p are causally or nomologically neces-
sitated by Pparts. 
The only materialists who would endorse (i) are the more extreme materi-
alists: a priori identity theorists, analytical functionalists, or eliminativists. 
Options (ii) and (iii) express the preferred modes of explanation for most 
materialists, the former being embraced by a posteriori identity theorists 
and those who hold that the physical realizes the mental, the latter by 
those who advocate a causal emergence theory (CET), according to which 
mental property instances are distinct from, yet caused by, physical prop-
erty instances.14 Hasker's emergent dualism is a version of CET (albeit an 
anti-materialist one) since it entails that the mind's states are caused by 
the states of p's parts. In principle then Hasker is not opposed to causal or 
nomological necessitation between physical and mental states. Why does 
he deny the materialist this option? 
The reason Hasker thinks the materialist cannot embrace (iii) is that 
p, as a composite material object, is strictly speaking a system of objects, 
and this implies that there can be no causal process connecting P arts with 
SQ. Hasker's defense of (2) ultimately boils down to an additiori'al argu-
ment he presents for this conclusion, which I shall call Defense (from 
p. 139 of The Emergent Self I have changed some of Hasker's notation to 
match my own). 
(D1) 
(D2) 
(D3) 
(D4) 
(DS) 
(D6) 
(D7) 
(D8) 
(D9) 
Suppose SQ is not logically or conceptually deducible from 
P . parts 
Ppa,ts causally necessitates SQ (Provisional Assumption) 
There is a causal process (CP) connecting Pparts with SQ [from 
D2] 
CP consists of events involving concrete individuals 
The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most PI' 
P2' ... , Pn and P 
P is not a concrete individual distinct from PI' P2' ... , Pn 
The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most PI' 
P2' ... , Pn [ DS, D6 ] 
All the events involving PI' P2' ... , Pn are already included in 
P parts, 
CP is not a causal process that connects P arts with SQ [ D1, D6, 
D7, D8] p 
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(OlD) It is not the case that Pparts causally necessitates SQ [ 03, 09 
indirect proof] 
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Though Hasker does not seem to notice this, or does not mention it, an ar-
gument analogous to Defense could be mounted against the materialisms 
that entail (ii). Simply replace the word 'causally' with 'metaphysically' 
in (02), and replace reference to causal processes with reference to super-
venience relations. A little reflection will show that one would arrive at 
the conclusion that it is not the case that P parts metaphysically necessitates 
S . So if Defense and its analogous argument are sound then this does 
effminate all interpretations of Explain other than (i) and provides us with 
good grounds for accepting premise (2) of Hasker's UOC Argument. 
Unfortunately for Hasker, Defense is not sound. The rub comes in prem-
ise (06). The most natural reading of this premise seems to be as follows: 
(06)* If:3x (x = p), then x = PI' or x = P2' or ... or x = Pn 
Recall that p is the brain and PI' P2 ... Pn are its proper parts. If the ante-
cedent of (06)* is true, then the consequent is false, for no object can be 
identical to one of its proper parts. So (06)* is true only if -::lx(x=p), i.e. only 
if there is no object picked out by 'p.' But premises (01), (02), and (03) all 
imply that 'p' does pick out a concrete individual, for all of those premises 
imply that p exemplifies a property (remember that SQ just is the state of the 
mind's-in this case p-exemplifying Q). SO if (06) is read as (06)*, it is ei-
ther false, or renders several other premises in the argument nonsensical. 
However, there is perhaps a more charitable reading of (06). Hasker 
suggests that when an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then 
the whole "is nothing but a system of objects ... there is no such thing 
as a whole 'over and above' the sum of the parts" (p. 130). Another phi-
losopher who speaks this way is O.M. Armstrong, who in discussing the 
part/whole relationship writes: "whatever supervenes or ... is entailed 
or necessitated ... is not something ontologically additional to the subve-
nient, or necessitating, entity or entities. What supervenes is no addition 
of being."Is Perhaps then we should take Hasker's (06) to be expressing a 
supervenience relation between the properties of p and the properties of 
Pi' P2 ... Pn· I suppose this is a type of strong supervenience, with the op-
erative modality being at least metaphysical necessity. This understand-
ing of (06) can now be expressed as follows: 
(06)** The properties of p strongly supervene (with metaphysical ne-
cessity) on P I par s 
However, even given this interpretation of (06), (07) does not follow. The 
truth of (06)** does not exclude p from being an individual involved in a 
causal process. Hasker might argue that since p's existence and its prop-
erties are entailed by the existence and properties of p's parts, there is no 
room for S to be caused by the properties of p's parts, as (02) stipulates. 
But this doesn't follow-supervenience is a synchronic, noncausal expla-
nation; it does not" compete" with causal explanations. As a matter of fact, 
it may very well be that the causal relationship between ParIs and SQ that 
Hasker finds so problematic partially explains the superveriience relation-
ship. Suppose one held that properties were individuated by their causal 
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powers, and that the causal powers of properties were essential to them, 
thus making the laws of nature metaphysically necessary.16 Then, if there 
is a causal law (synchronic though it be) linking the properties involved 
in P to Q SQ follows from P t with metaphysical necessity. If one were 
~~ F' 
to add the assumption that Q's causal profile is such that it can only be 
caused by the properties involved in Ppafts' then Q strongly supervenes on 
these properties, and the fact that P arts causes SQ is an explanation (or a 
partial one at least) of this superveni~nce. 
However, if one is not comfortable with synchronic causation, or the 
idea that the causal powers of properties are essential to them, one can 
still sketch a picture representing the denial of (07) as consistent with 
(06)**. Suppose S occurs at a time t2 later than t l , and that parts of the 
brain instantiate s~ightly different properties at those times (so that, for 
example, PI instantiates Tj at tj and Tj* at t2). Here are two explanations of 
p's exemplifying Q: 
(I) p exemplifies Q at t2 because Q supervenes on Tj *pj & T2 *Pz & ... & 
Tn *Pn & R*(pj .... Pn) at t2· 
(II) P exemplifies Q at t2 because SQ is causally necessitated by Tjp] & 
T2P2 & ". & T"p" & R(p]" .. p) at t j • 
I see nothing inconsistent in these explanations. But if there is nothing 
inconsistent in them, then (07) does not follow from (06)**. I suppose one 
might try to advance an argument for the inconsistency of (I) and (II), but 
there is no such argument to be found in Hasker. 
Given all this, I think we should conclude that Defense is unsound. Ei-
ther (D6) is false, or (D7) does not follow from (DS) and (D6). Thus, I think 
that Hasker has not given us any reason to think that (i) is a better inter-
pretation of Explain than (ii) or (iii). But the warrant one has for accepting 
(2) of the UOC Argument accrues from the warrant one has for denying 
(ii) and (iii) as viable interpretations of Explain. So I think we have little 
warrant for accepting (2), and thus the materialist should not feel at all 
threatened by Hasker's UOC Argument. 
IV. A UOC Argument against Emergent Dualism 
Given that Hasker's UOC Argument fails, Hasker has given us no con-
vincing reason to think the unity of consciousness poses a problem for 
materialism. However, I believe there may be excellent reason to think the 
unity of consciousness poses a problem for Hasker's emergent dualism; 
in fact, I think it poses a problem for all varieties of CET, as I will argue 
presently. It is at least true, I will contend, that this argument against CET 
based on PUT is stronger than Hasker's UOC Argument, for the former 
relies on assumptions that are less contentious than the claim that (i) is the 
only viable interpretation of Explain. My argument, which I will call the 
UOC Argument against CET actually requires an extension of PUT, what 
I will call the Modally-charged Phenomenal Unity Thesis, or McPUT: 
McPUT: Necessarily (in all metaphysically possible worlds), for any set 
of simultaneous phenomenally conscious states of a subject, all mem-
bers of that set are phenomenally unified. 
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Once one accepts PUT, making the move to McPUT does not seem much 
of a stretch-it is hard to imagine how if PUT is true it is not true at all 
possible worlds. Still, I admit my upcoming argument is most vulnerable 
at McPUT itself, inasmuch as PUT is vulnerable. However, since PUT is a 
sword that Hasker seems to wield in his own argument against material-
ism, I take it as a reasonable starting point in constructing an argument 
against his viewY 
Allow me then to briefly sketch the UOC Argument against CET and 
offer some points in its favor. 18 Suppose MI and M2 are distinct, simulta-
neous phenomenal states of a subject and MT is the state subsuming the 
phenomenology of M[ and M2 • Also suppose that CI , C2 and CT are states 
that are the causes of MI, M2 and MT respectively. CET implies that Cl, C2 
and CT all involve at least one physical state. But on the supposition that 
all causal laws involving at least one physical state are contingent, it is 
possible that even though CI, Cz and CT all occur, MT could fail to occur 
while MI and M2 do occur. But McPUT implies that this is not possible. So 
McPUT implies the denial of CET.19 
Reaching this conclusion obviously depends upon, one, accepting that 
causal laws involving physical states are contingent and, two, accepting 
that this contingency implies that MT is metaphysically independent from 
(i.e. does not follow with metaphysical necessity from) MI and M z. Now 
while I think it is reasonable to consent to both of these suppositions, de-
nying one or the other is certainly a way for the advocate of CET to side-
step the troublesome (to her) conclusion of my argument. I want to briefly 
comment on each of these potential ways out, suggesting that they may 
not be as promising as one might initially think. Denying that the laws of 
nature are contingent as a rule involves accepting that the causal powers 
of properties are essential to them. But accepting such a thesis about prop-
erties should not sit well with the proponent of CET. One of the principal 
motivations for embracing CET is to countenance the novel causal powers 
of conscious states. But if emergent properties follow with metaphysical 
necessity from physical properties, it seems we lose motivation to include 
emergent properties in our ontology. If the instantiation of some physical 
property P' metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of an emergent 
property E at some later time, and if the instantiation of a distinct physical 
property P* at a still later time necessarily follows from the instantiation 
of E and a third physical property P, it seems simpler to attribute E's causal 
powers to P and either eliminate E or identify E with P. Another way to 
state this concern is that it seems more ontologically parsimonious to sup-
pose that physical entities have latent causal powers "activated" only in 
certain contexts and that such causal powers belong to the entity's physi-
cal properties.20 So, it is not clear that embracing the metaphysical neces-
sity of laws involving physical states is the panacea the proponent of CET 
might hope it to be.zl 
With respect to the second way out for the defender of CET, the most 
natural reason for denying that the contingency of laws involving physi-
cal states implies Ml and M z could occur without MT is to say that the 
laws involving MT supervene on the laws involving M[ and M z• Even so, 
my argument for the incompatibility of CET and McPUT would still go 
through if there were a nomologically possible world in which MI and Mz 
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are instantiated but none of the potential causes of MT are instantiated. 
And that sure seems possible, enough so that the proponent of CET owes 
us an explanation why it is not possible. Perhaps the most promising ex-
planation would be that MT just is the conjunction of M1 and M2• But if 
there is such a thing as the conjunction Ml and Mz' it is not at all clear that 
it is a mental state. One can be in the state of believing A and the state of 
believing B without being in the state of believing A and B. This would not 
be possible were this latter belief state the conjunction of the former states. 
So the advocate of CET must provide a good reason for supposing that 
phenomenal states differ from belief states in this regard for this response 
to carry much weight. 
V. Conclusion 
In sum, I think there is a sound basis for thinking the CET-theorist faces a 
formidable challenge in accommodating the unity of consciousness. By my 
lights, UOC Argument against CET is stronger than Hasker's UOC argu-
ment in that the former relies on less controversial supporting premises. 
Thus, I believe it is emergent dualism, not materialism, that confronts the 
greater challenge from the unity of consciousness. Admittedly though, I 
have only scratched the surface of a satisfactory defense of PUT, and I have 
given only the tersest response to some potential objections to the other cru-
cial premises of the UOC Argument against CET. Only a more detailed 
exploration of PUT, as well as potential rejoinders to the reasons I have 
proffered for thinking PUT incompatible with CET, will decide whether the 
challenge the unity of consciousness poses to CET is or is not insuperable.22 
Indiana University at South Bend 
NOTES 
1. "Concerning the Unity of Consciousness," Faith and Philosophy 12:4, 
pp. 532-547. 
2. The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). All page 
number references in the text are to this book. 
3. The term 'materialism' as I use it should be understood as a thesis only 
about the mind, and not the more ambitious thesis that everything is material. 
As I've defined materialism, one way for the materialist to skirt the conclusion 
of the UOC argument is to hold that the mind is a material simple, a view that 
seems implausible to me, but is immune from Hasker's argument. 
4. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Sci-
ence, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 27, 
quoted in The Emergent Self, p. 130. I assume that when Sellars and Hasker 
speak of one property "consisting in" another, this is useful shorthand for say-
ing that certain facts or states of affairs consist in other facts or states of affairs. 
Throughout the paper, I will often employ this useful shorthand as well. 
5. Again, to say that instantiations of non-qualitative properties do not log-
ically or conceptually necessitate the instantiation of qualitative ones is short-
hand for saying that the facts describing such instantiations do not bear such a 
relation to each other. In endorsing this thesis, Hasker is siding with those who 
defend an explanatory gap between physical facts and mental facts. 
THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43 
6. This premise assumes that it could not be the case that p and mare 
distinct and yet both exemplify Q. But I assume that is an assumption both 
materialists and dualists would agree upon-it would seem metaphysically 
extravagant to have two distinct entities instantiating qualitative properties 
responsible for consciousness. 
7. For lists and discussion of various unity theses, see Barry Dainton, 
Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience (London: 
Routledge, 2000) and Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, "What is the Unity of 
Consciousness?" in A. Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, 
Integration, Dissociation (Oxford, 2003), pp. 23-58. Hasker explicitly endorses 
one trivial type of unity, what Bayne and Chalmers call subject unity or SUT. 
Two conscious states are subject unified if they belong to the same subject at 
the same time. This comports with what Hasker says in footnote 40 on p. 126 
of The Emergent Self that the only "unity" he has in view "is the mere fact of 
being experienced simultaneously by a single subject." But SUT really has no 
role to play in Hasker's UOC argument, for there is no premise whose truth 
depends on SUT. So Hasker is incorrect in saying that this type of unity is all 
nis argument requires. 
8. See Kant's Critique of Pure Reasoll, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1965), p. 335 (A352) 
9. For his development of the unity of consciousness in terms of co-
consciousness, see Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. 
10. Bayne and Chalmers, in "What is the Unity of Consciousness?" p. 32. 
11. Roughly, we can say that if phenomenal state PI subsumes phenom-
enal state P2, then "what it's like to be" in P2 is included in "what it's like to 
be" in PI. 
12. Mike Rea raised to me the objection that PUT faces a serious problem, 
for it appears that if it is true, an implausible regress ensues. Suppose a sub-
ject is in distinct phenomenal states PI and P2. According to PUT, the subject 
must also be in P3, a state subsuming the phenomenology of PI and P2. But 
since P3 is also a phenomenal state, PUT implies there must be a state P4 
subsuming the phenomenology of P1-P3, and then a state P5, P6, and so on. 
So it appears that if one a subject is in even one phenomenal state, she is in 
an infinite number. The way out of this regress, it seems to me, is to recognize 
that the subsumption relation is reflexive. So, if one is in distinct phenomenal 
states PI and P2 subsumed by P3, P3 subsumes not only PI and P2, but also 
itself, obviating the need for the further states P4, P5, etc. This is the response 
Bayne and Chalmers give to a similar objection. See "What is the Unity of 
Consciousness?" p. 40. 
13. Some may question why I do not object to (3). Premise (3) doesn't trou-
ble me in that it seems a reasonable way to interpret the locution "consists 
in." Clearly some properties of objects bear this relation to the properties of 
their parts-'having mass of 5 kg' is probably a prime example of a property 
of a whole that "consists in" the properties and relations of the parts of the 
whole. 
14. One prominent defender of CET (other than Hasker) is Timothy 
O'Connor. See his "Causality, Mind, and Free Will," Philosophical Perspectives, 
14 (2000), pp. 105-117. 
15. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 12. 
16. See, e.g., Sydney Shoemaker "Causality and Properties," in Time and 
Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Peter van Inwagen (ed.), (Dordecht: 
Reidel, 1980), pp. 109-36. Later I offer a reason for thinking that the proponent 
of CET should not adopt this view, but I raise the possibility here merely as a 
way for her to respond to Hasker. 
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17. Hasker has objected to me that PUT is not necessary to premise (I), 
for a separate case could be mounted (independent of PUT) for the existence 
of SQ' In other words, all his argument requires is a particular truth, that Sq 
exists, and not a universal generalization like PUT. But it's hard to see what 
a defense of SQ divorced form PUT would look like. I have already suggested 
that the expenential evidence we have for a unified consciousness can be ac-
commodated by a view like Dainton's which entails that SQ does not exist. It 
just seems to me that any suggestion that PUT is false, but that SQ still exists 
would be ad hoc. But I leave it to the reader to decide. 
18. I present a fuller exposition and defense of the premises of this argu-
ment in my dissertation, which is entitled liThe Metaphysics of Ontological 
Emergence" 
19. The reader might wonder, given that my rejection of Hasker's UOC ar-
gument was ultimately based on my rejection of Defense, Hasker's argument 
against CET, whether the soundness of this new argument against CET would 
vindicate Hasker's UOC argument. The answer is no. Though the soundness 
of my argument would eliminate (i) as a viable interpretation of Explain, it 
would not eliminate (ii). Thus a materialist would still have a principled rea-
son for denying (2) of Hasker's argument, namely, that (ii) is a better interpre-
tation of Explain than (i). 
20. Also, another way to look at this, the metaphysical necessity of the 
laws and the fact that properties are individuated by their causal powers im-
plies that E and P are always co-instantiated when the antecedent and con-
sequent circumstances are the same. This seems strong motivation to at least 
identify the instance of E with the instance of P. Does this imply the reduction 
of the E type? I think it does, but this is a complex issue that I can't discuss 
here. I should note that Hasker endorses the view that the causal powers of 
properties (property instantiations, actually) are essential to them, and thus 
that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary (see, for example, The 
Emergent Self, p. 71), but he does not discuss the objection I have raised. Timo-
thy O'Connor, however, in an unpublished paper co-authored with Hong Yu 
Wong entitled liThe Metaphysics of Emergence," does discuss this objection 
in some detail. These authors suggest it is actually more reasonable and on-
tologically parsimonious to posit emergent properties rather than "hidden" 
physical dispositions. I disagree with them, but clearly the issues surrounding 
this point are complex and require much more investigation into the nature of 
ontological reduction and ontological parsimony before anything decisive can 
be said. 
21. The proponent of CET might be tempted to respond that the laws of 
nature, though necessary, are probabilistic, thus allowing her to say that E 
does possess novel causal powers, in that the laws relating (E and P') to P* are 
distinct from laws relating P' to P*, because the "chances" involved in such 
laws are different. But "going chancy" backfires. Admitting that laws of na-
ture are only probabilistic implies that, even though the law relating CT to Mr 
obtains, CT still might occur without MT occurring, and this seems to suggest 
that M and M might occur without M . 
22. 1: would like to thank David Charmers, Alvin Plantinga, Mike Rea, Fritz 
Warfield, and most especially William Hasker for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. The paper also benefited from the helpful suggestions of 
two anonymous referees. 
